Bharat SainiLast Updated on November 15, 2017 by Bharat Saini
India, known for its peaceful revolts and history of non-violence, has long positioned itself as a peace-loving nation. Rooted in ethical and moral values, India has weathered centuries of foreign rule, enduring significant hardships and suffering for basic necessities and dignity. This commitment to peace and non-violence continues to shape India’s foreign and defense policies, including its nuclear doctrine.
India’s ‘No First Use’ (NFU) nuclear policy, which pledges that India will not use nuclear weapons unless first attacked by an adversary, reflects this peace-centric ideology. The country has also made multiple diplomatic efforts to foster amicable relations with Pakistan, despite Pakistan’s actions that have consistently strained bilateral ties. While India continues to prioritize peace, there is growing debate about whether its NFU policy should be revised in light of contemporary security challenges, particularly from Pakistan and China.
Revisiting the ‘No First Use’ Policy: The Case For
India is one of the few nuclear-armed nations committed to an NFU policy. Alongside China, India has declared that it will not use nuclear weapons preemptively. However, the close military and strategic ties between China and Pakistan, and their common goal of destabilizing India, suggest that India’s NFU policy might be due for reconsideration.
Pakistan, with the backing of China, has been accused of fueling terrorism in India, especially concerning the long-standing conflict in Jammu and Kashmir. The current geopolitical scenario is marked by increasing threats, including nuclear rhetoric from Pakistan. These factors highlight the limitations of India’s NFU policy, which could potentially leave the nation vulnerable.
Furthermore, India’s adherence to a policy of “minimum deterrence,” meaning it maintains only a small arsenal of nuclear weapons, aligns with its ethical stance but poses strategic concerns. With escalating tensions and nuclear threats from its neighbors, this policy could become a weakness. To ensure India’s security, there is a growing sentiment that the country must be prepared for any nuclear emergency, which may necessitate a more flexible nuclear doctrine.
The Trustworthiness of Pakistan
While Pakistan has also pledged to use nuclear weapons defensively, there is significant skepticism about whether this commitment can be trusted. Given Pakistan’s history of harboring terrorism, India cannot afford to rely solely on moral high ground. The stakes are too high for a country as large and populous as India to base its security on such uncertainties. A revision of the NFU policy could serve as a stronger deterrent, signaling to Pakistan that any threat to India’s security will be met with immediate and decisive action.
The Cost of Morality
India’s peaceful behavior, while commendable, has often come at a high price, particularly in terms of human lives. The loss of Indian soldiers in border skirmishes with Pakistan is well-documented, and many argue that India’s NFU policy has only emboldened its adversaries. Continuing to adhere to this policy, despite Pakistan’s provocations, might ultimately compromise India’s security.
A shift in policy could signal a no-tolerance approach to terrorism. By abandoning NFU, India would demonstrate that it is neither afraid nor incapable of defending itself, thereby sending a strong message to Pakistan. Such a move could deter Pakistan from further acts of aggression, including terrorism, and put an end to the constant loss of Indian soldiers.
The Case Against Revising India’s ‘No First Use’ Policy
Despite these arguments, revising India’s NFU policy comes with significant risks. Since the publication of India’s nuclear doctrine in 2003, the NFU stance has been a central tenet of the country’s nuclear strategy. Successive governments, including that of Prime Minister Narendra Modi, have reaffirmed India’s commitment to this policy. A revision of NFU would not only contradict India’s long-standing approach as a reluctant nuclear power but could also undermine the country’s international standing as a responsible nuclear state.
Credibility of Deterrence
India’s NFU policy, coupled with a minimal nuclear arsenal, provides a credible deterrent to potential adversaries. The threat of massive retaliation in the event of a nuclear strike remains a powerful disincentive for any nation considering a first strike against India. By adhering to NFU, India maintains a clear distinction between conventional and nuclear warfare, ensuring that nuclear weapons are not used as instruments of statecraft.
Roger Myerson, a Nobel-winning game theorist, argues that deterrence is most effective when it balances restraint with resolve. India’s NFU policy embodies this principle by signaling both restraint and the promise of overwhelming retaliation if deterrence fails. The ambiguity surrounding India’s exact response to a nuclear strike only enhances the deterrent effect, forcing adversaries to contemplate the worst possible outcome.
Stability in Nuclear Relations
Maintaining the NFU policy also contributes to stability in nuclear relations between India and its neighbors. By publicly committing to not use nuclear weapons first, India reduces the likelihood of an arms race or miscalculation during a crisis. Pakistan, for example, would be less likely to launch a preemptive strike out of fear that India might strike first. This policy injects a critical buffer into decision-making processes, giving both nations more time to consider the catastrophic consequences of nuclear conflict.
Moreover, India’s conventional military superiority over Pakistan means that there is little incentive for India to resort to nuclear weapons first. The NFU policy reinforces this, ensuring that nuclear weapons remain a last resort.
Global Perception and Responsibility
India’s NFU policy has also enhanced its reputation as a responsible nuclear power. Since its nuclear tests in 1998, India has consistently positioned itself as a country committed to global peace and stability. Abandoning the NFU policy could damage this image, drawing criticism from the international community and potentially leading to diplomatic isolation. In contrast, maintaining NFU aligns India with other nations that prioritize restraint and responsible nuclear behavior.
Conclusion: To Revise or Not to Revise?
The debate over India’s NFU policy is complex, with strong arguments on both sides. On one hand, the changing geopolitical landscape, particularly the threats posed by Pakistan and China, suggests that India’s current nuclear doctrine may no longer be sufficient to safeguard its security. On the other hand, revising the NFU policy could undermine India’s credibility as a responsible nuclear power and destabilize relations with its neighbors.
Ultimately, the decision to revise India’s nuclear doctrine must balance moral principles with strategic realities. While the NFU policy has served India well for decades, the nation must remain flexible in responding to emerging threats. Any changes to the policy should be carefully considered, with the goal of preserving India’s security without compromising its commitment to peace and non-violence.
